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Settlement of First 
Collective Agreement 
An Examination of the Canada 
Labour Code Amendment 
S. Muthuchidambaram 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rationale behind 
and provisions of a récent amendment to the Canada Labour 
Code, where the parties negotiating a first collective agreement 
are unable to reach agreement and hâve met ail the légal re-
quirements précèdent to a strike or lockout, the Minister of 
Labour may direct the Labour Relations Board to inquire into the 
dispute and if advisable settle the terms and conditions of the first 
collective agreement. That agreement will be binding on the par-
ties and in force for one year. The reactions of the organized 
labour and employers to this amendment are also discussed. 
According to a récent amendment to the Canada Labour Code, where 
the parties negotiating a first collective agreement are unable to reach agree-
ment and hâve met ail the légal requirements précèdent to a strike or 
lockout, the Minister of Labour may direct the Labour Relations Board to 
inquire into the dispute and if advisable settle the terms and conditions of 
the first collective agreement. That agreement will be binding on the parties 
and in force for one year. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rationale behind and provi-
sions of this amendment. The reactions of the organized labour and 
employers to this amendment are also discussed. Due considération is given 
to the U.S. expériences regarding first agreement in the light of certain 
similarities in the légal framework of industrial relations statutes in Canada 
and the U.S. Since the British Columbia Labour Code provision on first 
agreement is the prototype for the Fédéral Code amendment, the efficacy of 
B.C. expérience is analysed. A digest of the first case in which the Canada 
Labour Relations Board has applied this new amendment is also incor-
porated. On the basis of thèse discussions certain conclusions regarding the 
Fédéral Code amendment are arrived at. 
* MUTHUCHIDAMBARAM, S., Professor, Faculty of Administration, University of 
Regina. 
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK HITHERTO 
Industrial relations law in every Canadian jurisdiction requires in 
gênerai that employées be free to engage in three kinds of activity; to form 
themselves into unions, to engage employers in good faith bargaining, and 
to invoke meaningful sanctions in support of the bargaining.1 To achieve 
thèse objectives the law requires and promotes certain conduct of 
employers, unions and individual employées and proscribes certain other 
activities on their part which would nullify thèse objectives. Such prohibited 
activities are the unfair labour practices. There is the following purposive 
time-dimension in law with respect to employer unfair labour practices: At 
the time prior to the organization of the union, during the organization of 
the union, at the time when the union seeking récognition through certifica-
tion, and during the time of bargaining after certification.2 
The public policy choice for prohibiting employées unfair labour prac-
tices is based on the realization that the individual employée and union 
organizer are vulnérable to employer influence or intimidation. The follow-
ing section 44 of the fédéral Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation 
Act reveals this intent and purpose: 
"No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer shall seek 
by intimidation, by threat of dismissal, or by any other kind of threat, or 
by the imposition of a pecuniary or any other penalty or by any other 
means to compel an employée to refrain from becoming or to cease to be 
a member or officer or représentative of a trade union..." 
This section régulâtes the conduct of employer in the time-dimension 
previously mentioned with the exception of the time of bargaining after cer-
tification. To cover this aspect the law imposes a duty on both parties to 
bargain in good faith. That duty contains two ingrédients, which are 
technically and conceptually separable but functionally and behaviourally 
so blended as to lose their separate identities; the one "to bargain in good 
faith" and the other to make "every reasonable effort to make a collective 
agreement".3 
i CARROTHERS, A.W.R., Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, Butterworths, 
Toronto, 1965, p. 3 and 4. 
2 Ibid. p. 171. 
3 This basic légal framework is based on the Wagner Act of 1935, which is North 
America's first comprehensive industrial relations statute. Section 7 of this Act, guaranteed to 
employées "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through représentatives of their own choosing". By Section 8(a) (1), it was 
made an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfère with, restrain, or coerce employées 
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in S.7. 
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The récent amendment to the Fédéral Code is based upon the realiza-
tion that thèse provisions hâve not achieved the intended purposes, par-
ticularly so far as first collective agreements are concerned. 
PROBLEMS RELATED TO FIRST AGREEMENTS 
The magnitude of the problems related to the first agreement and the 
necessity for statutory remedy can be better appreciated through a review of 
the law in opération hitherto and of its effectiveness in regulating the con-
duct of the parties. 
Uniting employées into labour associations is an uphill task, negotia-
tion is a sluggish machine, and application of sanctions, though considered 
as bargaining by other means, is costly in monetary as well as human terms. 
How the parties behave and what stratégies they apply at the time prior to 
the organization of the union, during the organization of the union, and at 
the time when the union seeking récognition through certification hâve ail 
the borebodings of the catastrophe at the bargaining table for the first 
agreement. This problem has escalated in the récent past in certain sectors 
of the economy. 
The unorganized are mainly among white-collar workers, women, and 
those in small establishments, employing from 10 to 100 employées. 
Wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance and real estate and service in-
dustries and major part of communication industries are the least organized 
sectors. There are also plants in big urban centers which prefer to employ 
new immigrants and minority groups, not because of the employées 
cosmopolitan catholicity and humanitarianism, but because they know that 
thèse employées would serve as an insurance against unionization in the 
near future. Strategically, in thèse establishments, the employer s hâve an 
upper hand over the situation. It is not surprising that the union organizers 
consider this sector as industrial ghetto where they hâve to exercise their 
statutory right to association in a stealthy underground fashion.4 
Further, this sector is fascinated and to some extent benefited by the 
mushroom of consulting firms across the boarder specializing in the fine art 
of union-avoidance and union-bursting. They conduct seminars for thèse 
4 LIST, Wilfred, "Unions Wage An Underground Struggle to Organize the Small 
Plants", The Globe and Mail, April 13 and 14, 1970. 
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employers in ail the major urban centers across Canada5 and at times with 
tempting titles such as: UNIONS? ARE YOU AFRAID OF THEM? DO 
YOU WANT TO A VERT THEM? BEAT THEM? UNLOAD THEM? 
WANT TO KEEP YOUR ORGANIZA TION CLEAN?* 
There is another factor which complicates the situation still further; 
that is the existence of growing numbers of specialized law firms whose 
trade-mark is keeping unions out of an employer's plant or destroying them 
if they corne in; this is something which is simply unknown in most other 
démocratie industrialized countries.7 
This kind of industrial guerrilla warfare has been carried out by those 
employers who are opposed to unionization and collective bargaining either 
on ideological grounds of for pragmatic reasons. The following are the 
various tactics subtly used by them, in spite of the fact that most of thèse 
conducts are prohibited by the law on the basis of the total context: Effec-
tive use of captive audience, systematic interrogation of employées, pro-
mulgation and discriminatory enforcement of no-access, no-distribution 
and no-solicitation rules, threatened loss of certain existing benefits, either 
encouragement of formation or revival of a grievance committee as union 
substitution, management initiated pre-certification and post-certification 
litigations based on légal technicalities or loopholes with a view to frustrate 
unionization or to kill an infant union by sheer war of nerves, conversion of 
managements right to discipline employées into a union-hunting license, 
employer's systematic pre-certification polling of employées regarding their 
5 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour, Man-
power and Immigration, House of Gommons, Thirtieth Parliament, 1977-78, Issue No. 8, 
March 9, 1978, 8:42. This source is cited hereafter as: LMI, Proceedings and Evidence. Mrs. 
Shirley G.E. Carr, Executive Vice-Président of the Canadian Labour Congress, made the 
following statement before LMI regarding thèse seminars: "I might say for the record that as 
long as Canada allows outside people from the U.S. to corne into Canada and teach Canadian 
businessmen how to stay away from a trade union, we are always going to face that problem 
(union récognition and first collective agreement). In addition to that, to allow those people to 
collect on their income tax the registration fées is a disservice to the people of Canada who are 
paying for i t ." Ibid. 
6 Hère is one example : HO W TO KEEP THE UNION O UT! EMPL O YER PRE VEN-
TIVE LABOR RELATIONS: Two and a half day course on stratégies to fight unions and 
maintain non-union status. This was organized by the Canadian Management Centre of the 
American Management Associations/International; held December 5-7, 1977, Toronto: Fées 
AMA Members $375: Tax Déductible. 
7 KASSALOW, E.M., "Industrial Conflict and Consensus...: A Comparative 
Analysis", Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Winter Meeting, I.R.R.A. Séries, University 
of Wisconsin, Madison; 1978, p. 120. Also refer L.M.I. Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 
3, Feb. 16, 1978, 3:31. 
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union sentiments, and misuse of employer^ freedom of speech prior to, 
during, and after certification.8 
Under thèse circumstances it is easier for a union to hunt and catch a 
ghost than to charge the employers of thèse unfair labor practices and 
establish them with the necessary proof.9 The complexity involved in thèse 
cases has been well expressed by learned Judge Hand in the following classic 
passages regarding the employées bitter opinion of unions:10 
"No doubt an employer is as free as anyone else in gênerai to broadcast 
any argument he chooses against trade-unions; but it does not follow that 
he may do so to ail audiences. The privilège of "free speech", like other 
privilèges is not absolute; it has its seasons... Language may serve to 
enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays the speaker's feelings and 
desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree clouded, if the hearer 
is in his power... Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they hâve 
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each inter-
penetrate the other, but ail in their aggregate take their purport from the 
setting in which they are used, of which the relation between the speaker 
and the hearer is perhaps the most important part. What to an outsider 
will be no more than the vigorous présentation of a conviction, to an 
employée may be the manifestation of a détermination which it is not safe 
to thwart." 
This conflict situation is the midwife of almost ail new unions. "It is 
little wonder, in the face of this récognition struggle, that unions and 
management typically * square off as adversaries from the day the union 
begins to organize. This process, as well as past labour-management history 
and tradition, sets them into fixed adversary positions even if the union 
wins the élection and they begin negotiations."11 
8 For more détails on thèse and related matters refer: B.L. ADELL, Employer "Free 
Speech " in the United States and Canada, Reprint No. 8, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's 
University at Kingston, 1966; Bernard T. KING, "Pre-Election Conduct-Expanding Employer 
Rights and Some New and Renewed Perspectives", Industrial Relations Law Journal, Vol. 
2:185. 1977; and Report on the Labor Reform, Committee on Education and Labor, House of 
Représentatives, 95th Congress, lst Session, Report No. 95-637. 
9 Hon. John Munro, Minister of Labour, made the following statement before the 
Standing Committee on Labour: 
"The Canada Labour Relations Board certifies the employées as a bargaining 
unit for collective bargaining purposes. Then they go to negotiate with the 
employer, and it is spun out and spun out and spun out and spun out, and no col-
lective agreement is ever signed. Both sides charge each other with bargaining in 
bad faith, and so on. There are motions and applications before the Canada 
Labour Relations Board. It still spins out and, before you know it, the whole thing 
dies. The employées hâve moved and finally given up, and so on. This has happen-
ed innumerable times." 
LMI Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 2, Feb. 14, 1978, 2:22. 
10 N.L.R.B. V. Federbush Co., (1941) 121 F.2d 954, p. 957 (2nd cir.). 
n KASSALOW, E.M., op. cit. 
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The inadequacy or ineffectiveness of existing légal remédies regarding 
union récognition as well as negotiation of first agreement boils clown to a 
cost-benefit matrix of compliance with the law. "If the benefits from a cer-
tain action are greater than the costs, that action will be pursued by a firm. 
Since the potential benefit from engaging in unfair labor practices appears 
to exceed the costs to the violator, unfair labor practices occur."12 The 
irony of this matrix is that the law-abiding employer is at a compétitive 
disadvantage relative to the law breaker; the former cannot be judged too 
harshly if he falls prey to the irrésistible temptation of looking for subtle 
ways and means of evading the law without being caught. In this sensé the 
whole process seems to move in a vicious circle.13 
The évidence that more than fifty percent of the working hours lost 
because of strikes and lock-outs happening in connection with the first col-
lective agreement shows the magnitude of the problem and the need for 
statutory intervention.14 
SIMILAR EXPERIENCE IN THE U.S. 
The expérience in the United States regarding the first collective 
bargaining situation, the ineffectiveness of the existing légal remédies and 
the direction of needed policy change is similar to the Canadian one given 
the similarity of certain basic légal framework in industrial relations bet-
ween thèse two countries. 
The following statement by McCulloch, former chairman of the 
N.L.R.B. illustrâtes this point: 
"The losses to employées, especially in first bargaining situations, who 
are deprived for 1, 2 or sometimes many more years of their right to be 
represented are palpable. The weakening of their bargaining agent's 
status is admitted. The savings to respondent employers from delaying the 
onset of bargaining for thèse long periods can be enormous. Until this 
basic profit from unfair practices is removed, the incentive to mock the 
statute's premises with lengthy delays is apparently compelling. 
12 Prof. B.R. SKELTON reached this conclusion on the basis of his empirical study 
which he présentée! before the Committee on Education and Labor. Report on Labor Reform, 
op. cit., p. 9. 
13 FANNING, John H., Chairman, NLRB, "Reforming the National Labor Relations 
Act", Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Winter Meeting, Industrial Relations Research 
Association, (ed: Barbara D. Dennis), University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978, p. 154. 
u L.M.I. Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 3, Feb. 16, 1978, 3:32; Issue No. 8, 
Mardi 9, 1978, 8A: 19. 
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Moreover, to limit such a remedy to "clear and flagrant" violations,..., 
would tend to make thèse Board remédies punitive and would ignore the 
losses equally suffered by employées in cases involving doser légal or fac-
tual issues. I would prefer that Congress,..., emphasize the vindication of 
employées' rights, a majority having so chosen, to be represented and not 
make the remedy dépend upon the often difficult question of the degree 
of wilfulness of a particular respondent."15 
NEW STATUTORY REGULATIONS ON FIRST AGREEMENTS 
One of the policy objectives of the Canada Labour Code Amendment 
is to rectify the problems identified in the preceding sections regarding the 
first collective agreement.16 
Under this amendment17, where the parties negotiating a first collective 
agreement are unable to reach agreement and hâve met ail the légal re-
quirements précèdent to a strike or lockout, the Minister may direct the 
Board to inquire into the dispute and if advisable settle the terms and condi-
tions of the collective agreement. 
Upon such a referrai, the Board settles the terms and conditions of a 
first collective agreement which constitutes the agreement between the par-
ties and is binding on them, except to the extent that such terms and condi-
tions are subsequently amended by the parties by agreement in writing.18 
This agreement will be effective for a period of one year from the date on 
which the Board settles it.19 
The amendment also prescribes certain guidelines and criteria to be 
foliowed by the Board in settling the first collective agreement.20 The Board 
must give the parties an opportunity to présent évidence and make représen-
tations and the Board may take into account (a) the extent to which the par-
ties hâve, or hâve not, bargained in good faith in an attempt to enter into 
the first agreement between them; (b) the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, if any, negotiated through collective bargaining for employées per-
forming the same or similar functions in the same or similar circumstances 
15 Cited in Report on Labor Reform, op. cit., p. 40-41; For a summary of NLRB Task 
Force Report refer FANNING, J.H., op. cit. The U.S. Labor Reform Act of 1978 based on 
thèse recommendations was defeated at the Senate level. 
16 Bill C-8 was passed during the Third Session of the Thirt ieth Par l iament and given 
royal assent on May 12, 1978, with the majority of the Bill including the provision on first 
agreement, having been proclaimed in force on June 1, 1978; Chapter 27 of the Statutes of 
Canada, 1911-1 S. 
17 Section 171.1(1) of Bill C-8. 
18 Ibid., 171.1(2). 
19 Ibid., 171.1(4). 
20 Ibid., 171.1(3). 
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as the employée in the bargaining unit; and (c) such other matters as the 
Board considers will assist it in arriving at terms and conditions that are fair 
and reasonable in the circumstances.21 
The sum and substance of this amendment is a clear departure from the 
hitherto existing practice. The CLRB, at the exclusive initiative of the 
Minister, is now statutorily empowered to exercise jurisdiction over interest 
dispute seulement so far as first agreement is concerned. Obviously the con-
cerned parties — organized labor and employers — are bound to react to 
this amendment on the basis of their perception of the new balance of 
power introduced by this change in policy. 
ORGANIZED LABOUR'S REACTION 
Since the newly certified unions, under this amendment, hâve a better 
chance of withstanding the onslaught of those employers who prolong the 
negotiation of first agreement primarily as a tool of union extermination, 
the Canadian Labour Congress has taken the following stand regarding this 
change: 
"We fully agrée with...[the amendment]... The first agreement is of par-
ticular concern to us. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) prefers to 
limit government intervention into collective bargaining matters to a strict 
minimum, including the negotiations of the first contract. However, the 
expérience of past many years has convinced us that there is a class of 
employers who intend systematically to avoid any collective bargaining 
and thus to conclude a first agreement which would set a pattern. As a 
matter of fact, more than one half of the time lost through strikes and 
lockouts is due to the employer's attitude described above."22 
Having endorsed the gênerai intent and purpose of the amendment, the 
CLC proposed that Subsection 171.1(1) be modified in a way that the set-
ting up of the arbitration board should not solely rest with the Mïnister but 
should be done on the request of either party involved. In addition, the 
CLC suggested, that if some terms and conditions hâve already been agreed 
21 The aborted American Labor Reform Act of 1977 (S.8 of H.R. 8410) has the follow-
ing provision regarding first agreement: The NLRB is authorized, in cases where the employer 
has unlawfully refused to bargain for an initial contract, to award the employées compensation 
for the delay in bargaining. The workers would receive an amount based on the average wage 
settlements negotiated by workers at plants where collective bargaining proceeded lawfully. 
They would receive thèse wages retroactively from the time of the unlawful refusai to bargain 
until the bargaining begins. 
22 Proceedings and Evidence, LMI, Issue N o . 8, March 9, 1978, 8A:19: Submission by 
the C L C . 
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upon between the parties, the board should not be given powers to alter 
such a partial agreement.23 
But neither of thèse suggestions hâve been incorporated in the amend-
ment. Nor the CLC, either in its written submission to or oral évidence 
before the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration, 
did elaborate and justify the rationale behind and the operational implica-
tions of granting the right to initiate state intervention to either party in-
volved. Since the amendment requires the CLRB to give the parties an op-
portunity to présent évidence and make représentations, nothing prevents 
them from impressing upon the Board to leave the already agreed upon 
terms and conditions between them unaltered. Given its expertise and ex-
périence in resolving industrial disputes, it is highly improbable that the 
Board would go against such a unified wish of the parties regarding the 
already resolved problems. 
EMPLOYEES REACTION 
Given the adversary nature of our industrial relations System, it is not 
surprising that the organized labor's qualified 'Yes' to the amendment is fit-
tingly foliowed by employers' emphatic 'No' to it.24The employers' associa-
tions hâve opposed this amendment on the ground that it would undermine 
the basic principles of collective bargaining. The following statement by the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters élaborâtes this contention: 
"It must be first recognized that the new provision will, in almost 
every instance, lead to compulsory arbitration in first agreement situa-
tions. It is true that the référence to the Board is only after the parties 
hâve been given opportunity to negotiate voluntarily a first collective 
agreement... However, should the amendment be brought into effect, ail 
negotiations for first agreements would thereafter be conducted in the 
light of the prospect of interférence by the Minister in the dispute. 
23 Ibid. 
IA For complète détails of employers' reactions refer: LMI Proceedings and Evidence, 
Issue No. 3, Feb. 16, 1978, The Canadian Manufacturas' Association and Chamber of Com-
merce; Issue No. 4, Feb. 24, 1978, The Canadian Grain Handling Industry; Issue No. 5, Feb. 
28, 1978, The Canadian Association of Broadcasters; Issue No. 6, March 2, 1978, The Railway 
Association of Canada; Issue No. 7, March 8, 1978, Bell Canada; Issue No. 9, March 14,1978, 
The Canadian Trucking Association; and Issue No. 10, March 15, 1978, The Canadian 
Bankers' Association. 
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Negotiating positions would be established with a view to a party's posi-
tion before the Labour Relations Board."25 
The employers' submissions uniformly question the appropriateness 
and adequacy of the criteria by which the Board is to détermine the first 
agreement.26 In their view, the Board has been given extremely broad discre-
tionary authority as evidenced by a provision in the amendment which 
reads: "such other matters as the Board considers will assist it in arriving at 
terms and conditions that are fair and reasonable in the circumstances."27 
The following submission made by the Canadian Manufacturer' Associa-
tion sums up their concerns: 
"The discretionary power conferred upon the Minister and the 
Board would create uncertainties for the parties. The employer, especial-
ly, would be in a difficult position as he would hâve lost an important élé-
ment of control over his labour costs... 
While bad faith bargaining is regrettable, it should not be the basis 
for determining wages and benefits, which are essentially économie 
issues, and other conditions of employment... 
Although the Board may consider provisions formed in other collec-
tive agreements, it should also consider the comparable rates of pay and 
working conditions provided by union-free employers... 
Failure to conclude first agreements is not so often related to the 
respective demands and offers of the parties, as it is to the représentative 
character of the newly certified union."28 
In addition to thèse objections, the efficacy of British Columbia (B.C.) 
expérience with a similar provision on first agreement has been seriously 
questioned by the employers.29 
AN EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL CODE AMENDMENT IN THE LIGHT 
OF B.C. EXPERIENCE WITH A SIMILAR LAW 
Since the British Columbia Labour Code provision on first agreement 
is the prototype in letter and spirit for the Fédéral Labour Code amend-
25 Issue No. 5, op. cit., 5A: 10. There are about 400 private broadeasting stations, out of 
which only 62 (15%) are unionized. At the time when the Broadcasters' Association made its 
submission before the LMI, there was a prolonging two and half years strike over negotiating a 
first agreement in a Lethbridge station. Issue No. 5, op. cit., 5:17. 
26 LMI Proceedings and Evidence, op. cit., Issue N o . 3, 3 A: 13 ; Issue N o . 5, 5 A: 11 ; Issue 
N o . 6, 6A:16, and Issue N o . 10, 10A:69. 
27 Section 171.1 (2) (c) of Bill C-8. 
28 LMI Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 3, 3A: 12 f. 
29 LMI Proceedings and Evidence, Issue N o . 10, 10A:66 f. 
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ment, the B.C. expérience in this matter warrants élaboration.30 Further, 
such an élaboration would partly serve as a means to assess the validity of 
the various objections and concerns raised by the employers' associations 
regarding the Fédéral Code amendment. 
Under Section 70 of the Labour Code ofBritish Columbia*1, when the 
parties negotiating a first agreement hâve failed to reach agreement the 
Minister may, at the request of either party and after investigation, direct 
the Board to inquire into the dispute and, if advisable, settle the terms and 
conditions of the collective agreement. The imposed agreement will be bin-
ding except to the extent that the parties mutually agrée to amendments.32 
The agreement will remain in force for one year from the date of its imposi-
tion by the Board.33 
30 Manitoba and Québec are the other Canadian jurisdictions having statutory régula-
tion regarding first agreement; thèse are not evaluated in this paper because of space limita-
tions: 
Manitoba, Labour Relations Act, S. 75.1 
For a year after 90 days following certification, if an employer increases the rate of wages of 
any employée or alters any other term or condition of employment, and this is done without 
permission of the bargaining agent while no collective agreement is in effect, the bargaining 
agent may request a code of employment from the employer. This code of employment is to be 
prepared and a copy given to the bargaining agent within 30 days. The board will détermine 
any dispute relating to the contents of the code. 
Automatic check-off and grievance arbitration provisions of the Labour Relations Act will ap-
ply to the code. The code will be in effect for one year following the request for its préparation 
and during this time the Act will apply as if a collective agreement were in effect. 
If the employer refuses to prépare a code of employment the board may prépare it and it will 
hâve the same statut as if prepared by the employer. The board will détermine any dispute 
relating to the contents of the code. 
Québec, Labour Code, Ss. 81a-81i 
After the intervention of a conciliator has been unsuccessful either party negotiating a first 
agreement may apply to the Minister to submit the dispute to a council of arbitration. Where 
referred to arbitration the council of arbitration will be composed as provided for in the législa-
tion. After investigation the council of arbitration may décide to détermine the contents of the 
collective agreement and there upon any strike or lockout in progress must end. Any matter 
upon which the parties agrée shall be included in the collective agreement unaltered by the 
council of arbitration. The arbitration award shall be binding for not less than one year nor 
more than two but may be modified, in whole or in part, by agreement of the parties. 
31 Labour Code ofBritish Columbia (Replacing Chapter 205, R.S.B.C. 1960), 1973 (2nd 
sess.), c. 122, S. 70.1. 
The author would like to thank Prof. Paul C. Weiler, former Chairman, Labour Relations 
Board of British Columbia, for his kind and prompt co-operation in sending me the necessary 
information regarding B.C. 
32 Ibid., S. 10.2. 
33 Ibid., S. 72. 
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There is a procédural différence between the B.C. Code and the 
Fédéral Code: Under the former, either party can request the intervention 
of the Minister, while the Fédéral Code does not confer such a right upon 
the parties. But it should be emphasized that, even under B.C. Labour 
Code, it is not obligatory on the Minister to grant that request; the Minister 
"may" intervene if he considers it "necessary or advisable". In that sensé, 
this procédural différence is not very significant. 
The common and fundamental assumptions behind thèse législations 
are twofold: First, the terms and conditions of employment should be settl-
ed by mutual agreement of the parties concerned, not to be imposed from 
the outside; second, only on rare occasions and for valid and urgent reasons 
seulement must be imposed from without. Thèse assumptions are vin-
dicated through a statutorily built-in double screening procédure. First, the 
Minister must décide whether a particular dispute warrants action under 
this provision. Second, upon referral, the Board itself is required to "in-
quire into the dispute" in order to détermine the advisability of imposing an 
agreement or taking an alternative course action. 
The Labour Relations Board of B.C. has explained the purpose and 
scope of S.70, in London Drugs Ltd. (1974) 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 140, in 
thèse words:34 
"The government had a very différent problem case in mind when it 
enacted s.70. A union has made its first appearance with an employer and 
has organized a relatively small unit. The employer opposed certification 
by one device or another, perhaps making veiled threats about the consé-
quences of unionization or even going to the lengths of firing a union sup-
porter. Notwithstanding this opposition, the union received certification 
from the Board, but its bargaining authority is tenuous. From that posi-
tion it must try to negotiate a first contract. The employer may drag thèse 
negotiations out, consenting to talk only about the language and structure 
of the agreement, and refusing to put any monetary offers on the table 
until ail thèse détails are settled. Meanwhile, some members of manage-
ment may hâve hinted to employées that they could receive a substantial 
pay increase without the union. Eventually, the union, unable to secure 
an agreement, calls a strike. However, some employées, both those 
originally opposed to the union and those now disenchanted by the lack 
of tangible results, refuse to go out. Those who do strike are easily replac-
ed because of the small size of the unit and the fact that the employées are 
not highly skilled. In that situation, the union has no économie leverage 
34 This is the first case decided by the Board under the first Collective agreement provi-
sions of the B.C. Labour Code. In this case the Board has interpreted S. 70 and S. 71 in the 
light of the total ambit of the B.C. Labour Code and since then thèse interprétations hâve been 
consistently used by it in other cases. 
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to budge the employer, negotiations and médiation are futile, and the 
employer can wait the union out. Eventually, a decertification application 
becomes timely and those who are then working may be a sufficient ma-
jority to achieve that resuit. 
This basic scénario, with variations in some of the détails, is a very 
familar one. It constitutes a persistent flaw in the actual working-out of 
the labour relations policy of the législation. The fundamental premise of 
the statute is that collective bargaining is to be facilitated when it is the 
choice of the majority. The reality is that a large number of small units, 
although organized and certified, never succeed in reaching a collective 
agreement. There is a spécifie requirement in s.6 of the Code that parties 
should bargain in good faith but expérience has shown that this does not 
cast a fine enough net to deal with the variety of methods by which bona 
fide and reasonable collective bargaining may be frustrated. What the 
Législature has proposed in s.70 is a positive remedy which it is hoped will 
do a better job than the standard device of cease and desist orders. 
The logic of that remedy is clear enough. Some employers are unwill-
ing to engage in meaningful negotiations because, despite the statute, they 
won't permit their hands to be tied by a union or a collective agreement. 
This provision should be a considérable disincentive to that effort, 
because it deprives such a party of the fruits of those tactics. A collective 
agreement will be imposed on it nonetheless." 
In settling the terms and conditions for a first collective agreement 
under Section 70, the Board must give the parties an opportunity to présent 
évidence and make représentation and may take into account, among other 
things, (a) the extent to which the parties hâve bargained in good faith and 
(b) the terms and conditions of employment, if any, negotiated through col-
lective bargaining for comparable employées performing the same or 
similar functions in the same or related circumstances.35 
Interprétation and application of thèse criteria are bound to raise cer-
tain question: Is "good-faith-bargaining" test a valid and relevant one for 
imposing a first agreement? Will a finding of bad faith in either party be 
reflected in the terms and conditions of the first agreement imposed by the 
Board as a punitive measure? Does the phrase "among other things" (the 
Fédéral Code équivalent: "such other matters") confer too broad a discré-
tion upon the Board? In summary terms, does the settlement of first agree-
ment by the "third party" discourage the fundamental spirit and purpose of 
"free collective bargaining" as we hâve known it hitherto? 
In fact, such are the questions raised by the employers with référence to 
the Fédéral Code amendment which is identical to S.71 to B.C. Labour 
35 B.C. Labour Code. S. 71. The Fédéral Code criteria are identical, supra S. 171.1(3). 
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Code.36 One way of ascertaining at least a partial answer to thèse questions 
is to identify the interprétation of this Section by the B.C. Labour Relations 
Board. 
"In London Drugs Ltd. the Board has observed that the absence of 
bad faith is not a bar to the existence of the Board's jurisdiction; nor a 
breach of good-faith-bargaining requirement is a sufficient condition précè-
dent to settling a first contract. The Board has taken the entire pattern of 
the conduct of the applicant as well as the respondent into considération 
prior to the break down of negotiation. In this sensé, the imposition of first 
agreement has been recognized by the Board as a remédiai measure and not 
a punitive one."37 
The purpose of this exercise is not just "finding" one party "guilty" 
and the other "not-guilty" but to résolve an initial deadlock-arising out of 
inexpérience in and ignorance of industrial relations or of a conscious effort 
to keep away from the four corners of the existing public policy-between 
the parties through an imposition of a temporary (one year) remedy with the 
intention that the parties will learn to live with each other afterwards. 
Thereafter the parties are outside the scope of thèse provisions. In this sensé 
the B.C. Board has described the first agreement as a form of "trial mar-
riage" imposed upon the parties for a limited period. 
Given the jurisdiction, composition and procédure of the Board and 
the fluidity and volatility of industrial relations, the Board may not be able 
to achieve the total statutory goal without sufficient discretionary power at 
its disposai; the translation of public policy into practice requires flexibility, 
innovation and expérimentation.38 Therefore, the discrétion granted to the 
Board in the phrase "among other things" is an enabling one to achieve the 
policy objective imposed on it in S.70 of the B.C. Labour Code. The phrase 
"such other matters" in the Fédéral Labour Code serves the same purpose. 
So far as the terms and conditions of the first agreement are concerned 
the B.C. Board has given due weight to union security without sacrificing 
employer viability. The following is the logic applied by this Board in Lon-
don Drugs Ltd.
 y which in fact is in tune with the intent and purpose of the 
overall objective of the Labour Code itself : 
"As regards the language and structure of the collective agreement, 
the Board does not believe that Section 70 should be used to achieve ma-
36 Supra Employers' Reaction. 
37 London Drugs Ltd., (1974) 1 C.L.R.B.R. 140; at 144. 
38 For an excellent analysis of thèse issues see WEILER, Paul C , "The Administrative 
Tribunal: A View From the Inside", 26, University of Toronto Law Journal, 193, (1976). 
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jor breakthroughs in collective bargaining. Instead, we will try to settle on 
terms which reflect a fairly gênerai consensus of what should be in a col-
lective agreement, as tailored to the requirements of the opération before 
us. We will leave it to future negotiations between thèse parties to develop 
any innovations in that language. However, as regards the monetary set-
tlement, we do not consider ourselves constrained to adopt a modest 
award simply because this is a first contract. The procédure in Section 70 
is intended to be used sparingly because of a troubled history of negotia-
tions and with the definite objective of getting a collective bargaining rela-
tionship underway. The background which produces a Section 70 in-
tervention from the Board also poses the danger of decertification ap-
plications by employées who are dissatisfied with the expérience they hâve 
had with collective bargaining. We intend to see that the collective 
agreements we settle under Section 70 are sufficiently attractive to the 
employées affected by them that they will think twice before applying to 
rid themselves of their union représentatives and thus forfeiting the agree-
ment... By the same token, we intend to write union security provisions 
which will not prove distasteful to the employées during this very impor-
tant first year of a collective agreement."39 
The various methods by which the Board has disposed of the applica-
tions seeking for imposition of a first agreement dispel the employers' con-
cern that this law would discourage the fundamental spirit and purpose of 
free collective bargaining and that every first agreement dispute might resuit 
in the imposition of an agreement from the outside. Since January 24,1974, 
when the provisions relating to the settlement of first collective agreements 
were proclaimed, 27 such applications hâve been referred to the British Col-
umbia Labour Relations Board by the Minister of Labour. The number of 
referrals by year and the distribution of cases by method of disposai applied 
by the Board are as follows:40 
Year: 1974 1975 1976 1977 1974-77 
Applications: 17 9 0 1 27 
Disposition: Contract Imposed: 
Application Rejected: 






On the basis of the preceding discussion regarding the B.C. expérience 
with the statutory intervention in settling first agreement the following con-
clusion is reached: The intervention of the Board has occurred sparingly, 
since it is subject to double screening procédure. Intervention in a dispute 
39 London Drugs Ltd., (1974) 1 C .L .R .B .R . 140; a t 147. 
40 Annual Report of the Labour Relations Board of British Columbia, 1977, p p . 51-54, 
LMI Proceedings and Evidence, Issue N o . 10, March 15, 1978, 10-A.-66-67. 
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does not guarantee the imposition of a first agreement not only because the 
Board has used its discrétion to promote the overall objectives of the 
Labour Code but it did not hesitate to use other means at its disposai to per-
suade the parties to settle the dispute by themselves with its assistance. In 
this sensé, the Board has used mediation-cum-arbitration procédure. The 
Board has been more interested in "resolving the problem" than "render-
ing a verdict" on it. The remédiai aspect of the law is as important as its 
déterrent value. The B.C. Board has summed up its expérience in thèse 
words:41 
"As a practical matter, this power is designed as a remedy for those 
cases where there were difficulties between the parties at the représenta-
tion stage and they hâve not been able to engage in serious, goodfaith 
bargaining following certification... However it should be noted that the 
Board does not automatically impose a first collective agreement on the 
parties, even where a persuasive application is made. Instead, it makes a 
determined effort to secure a voluntary seulement of the agreement. The 
objective of Section 70 is to foster an enduring collective bargaining rela-
tionship. In the Board's view, a solution agreed to by both parties is a 
much better foundation for such a relationship than an order imposed by 
the Board." 
CLRB'S DECISION ON RADIOMUTUEL42 
The imposition of a collective agreement in this case by the Canada 
Labour Relations Board applying this amendment for the first time has 
brought an end to a two year old industrial dispute of an extraordinary 
kind.43 The purpose of this section is to identify the jurisprudence developed 
by the Board in the light of the preceding section. 
41 AnnualReport - \911, op. cit., p . 32 and 33. 
42 The author would like to thank Mr . Marc Lapointe , Q . C . , Cha i rman , C L R B , for his 
kind and p rompt co-operation in sending me a copy of this décision in which the Fédéral Code 
amendment has been applied for the first t ime. 
43 Radiomutuel: C L R B Reasons For Décisions, N o . 675/78 of 20th, October , 1978; 
unrepor ted. A rétroactive provision made the amendment applicable to the parties in this case. 
Parties to the dispute: Syndicat général de la radio (CJMS) (CNTU); Syndicat des travailleurs 
de l ' information de la Mauricie (CJTR) (CNTU); Syndicat des employés de C J R S (CNTU); 
Syndicat général de la radio (CJMS) (CNTU) , parl iamentary correspondents; Syndicat général 
de la radio (CJMS) (CNTU); 
certified bargaining agents, 
- and -
C J M S Radio Montréal Limitée Montréal , Québec; CJTR Radio Trois-Rivières Limitée Trois-
Rivières, Québec; C J R S Radio Sherbrooke Limitée Sherbrooke, Québec; Radiodiffusion 
Mutuelle Limitée Montréa l , Québec; Radiodiffusion Mutuelle Limitée Montréal , Québec; 
employers 
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When the CLRB, at the initiative of the Minister of Labour, began to 
inquire into this dispute the employer sought a writ of prohibition. The 
Board successfully challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the ap-
plication. It was concluded that in the light of the récent amendment to the 
Canada Labour Code, a writ of prohibition could not be granted even if the 
Board were exceeding its jurisdiction in arranging to conduct an inquiry and 
establish the terms of a first agreement.44 
The behaviour of both the parties during this prolonged and agonizing 
struggle as well as their behaviour during the hearing has been appropriately 
described by the Board in its one-hundred page décision in thèse terms: "a 
holy war"; a '"Bernit' of Labour Relations";45 "a plague on both your 
house";46 "guérilla warfare";47 "dialogue of the deaf".48 
It was between the beginning of May 1977 and the Spring of 1978 the 
parties conducted their "negotiations"(?). Thèse negotiations were always 
accompanied by press statements, ultimatums, prerequisites, threats, 
violence, distrust, disdain and avowed hatred on the part of both parties 
and recourse to ail manner of tribunals.49 In the bellicose, political and 
highly vernacular language of which the Board has quoted a number of 
passages, the two sides exchanged accusations of bad faith. The union ac-
cused the employer of being anti-union, feudalistic, capitalistic, exploitative 
and even fascist. The employer accused the CNTU and the National Fédéra-
tion of Communication Workers of being irresponsible, Marxist, anar-
chiste, Leninist and vandalistic.50 
In terms of the évidence submitted by both sides, the Board received 
written représentations amounting to nearly 2000 pages of main positions, 
exhibits, documents, replies and additional replies.51 The quality of thèse 
massive submissions has been characterised by the Board as "MUCH ADO 
ABOUTNOTHING."52 
44 C.J.M.S. Radio Montréal (Québec) Limited V. Canada Labour Relations Board, 
Syndicat général de la Radio C.J.M.S. (CNTU) et al. (1978) C L L C 14, 163 (Fédéral Cour t 
Trial Division). 
45 Radiomutuel, op. cit., p. 86. 
46 Ibid., p. SI. 
47 Ibid., p . 32. 
48 Ibid., p. 2$. 
49 Ibid., p . 10. The Board has illustrated at length the accusations and counter accusa-
tions between the part ies. See p p . 10-25. 
50 Ibid., p . 55. 
51 Ibid., p . 45 . 
52 Ibid., p . 56. 
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On the basis of a thorough analysis of thèse documents and représenta-
tions and of the whole history of the dispute, the Board has identified the 
following causes for the failure of "negotiation": 
"But thèse représentations hâve also convinced the Board that the 
negotiations which took place were, to say the least, unusual and certainly 
unlikely to lead to a fruitful resuit. 
(a) A basic rule followed by any informed negotiator in industrial 
relations is to never or almost never lay down any prior conditions what-
soever. In this case, both parties were proceeding by constantly 
stipulating prior conditions. 
(b) A second rule is that negotiations should be conducted with the 
greatest discrétion in order not to embarrass the spokesmen and to leave 
them some margin for compromise. In this case, even print and broad-
casting média were sometimes felt at the bargaining table. 
(c) One should never discrédit the officiai spokesmen of a party 
publicly. Hère, the contrary practice was followed. 
(d) Collective bargaining is a very complex, subtle art, but it may be 
summarized as obtaining whatever is possible in given circumstances 
rather than trying to force the other party to accept integrally one's 
desired objectives. In this case, the file is full of proposed clauses which 
either one party or the other declared untouchable. 
(e) Bargaining techniques vary infinitely and reflect the individual 
personality of each negotiator. It is important that each negotiator respect 
the other's individuality; otherwise, everything becomes rapidly 
unbearable and paralysed. In this case it was the opposite. If one rereads 
some of the passages quoted, one cannot help but conclude that the men-
tality revealed was déplorable."53 
In the light of thèse facts the Board has reached the inévitable conclu-
sion of imposing a collective agreement upon the parties. 
The Board has interpreted the relevant sections of the Fédéral Code in 
the light of the jurisprudence developed by the LRB of B.C. and the prin-
cipes established by the latter hâve been generally endorsed by the CLRB.54 
The CLRB has determined the terms and conditions of the first collec-
tive agreement in this case not only on the basis of the extracts from collec-
53 Ibid., pp. 25 and 26. 
54 Ibid., p p . 60-62; 75-77; 80-84. The décisions of the B .C . LRB cited by the C L R B are: 
LondonDrugsLtd., (1974) 1 Canadian LRBR 140.; VictorRegistry Services(1974) 1 Canadian 
LRBR 440.; M & H Machinery & Iron Works Ltd., Décision No. 114/74 of August 1974, 
Unreported; Bond Brothers Sawmill Ltd., Décision No. 155/74 of November 1974, 
Unreported; Dominion Directory Company Ltd., (1975) 2 Canadian LRBR 345.; Century 
Plaza Hôtel Ltd., Décision No. 68/75 of October 1975, Unreported; Vancouver Island 
Publishing Co. Ltd., (1976) 2 Canadian LRBR 225. 
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tive agreements cited by the parties but also on the basis of a study of seven-
teen collective agreements in existence in this industry.55 
The following are the salient features of this agreement56: To begin 
with the Board has made a deliberate décision against imposing an elaborate 
and complète collective agreement and hence the agreement contains only 
the essential clauses. The intent of this brevity is to allow the parties to draw 
up clauses relating to détails hoping that during which time the parties may 
learn the art of dialogue and of achieving the "possible". The Board has ac-
cepted certain clauses on which the parties agreed and has added entirely 
new clauses and dealt particularly with union récognition, union security, 
grievance, arbitration and seniority. 
With regard to grievance arbitration, the Board has coupled a tight 
grievance clause with a System of arbitration under which the arbitrators 
(five in number) will be required to work in rotating order. The Board has 
consulted the parties individually and in secret in order to détermine the 
wishes of the parties regarding the sélection of arbitrators and then it has 
asked them to provide it with other lists of names of arbitrators. It should 
be noted that the five arbitrators selected by the Board are not necessarily 
the parties' first choices but the parties hâve unknowingly agreed on a 
number of the names which now appear in the collective agreement. 
Moreover, before finalizing the list of arbitrators the Board has spoken 
with thèse arbitrators and has specifically encouraged them to explore the 
possibility of using certain new techniques which are currently being tested 
in an attempt to expedite grievance arbitration.57 
Though the CLRB is in fundamental agreement with and has closely 
foliowed the jurisprudence developed by the B.C. LRB on first collective 
agreement, it does not accept the "trial-marriage" analogy of the latter to 
describe this type of agreement. The reasons are as follows: 
"As we hâve just seen, in London Drugs supra, the Chairman of the 
British Columbia Board used the expression "trial-marriage" to describe 
the imposition of a first collective agreement. After careful considération, 
55 Ibid., pp. 90-92. 
56 Ibid., p p . 90-99. 
57 Regarding this technique the Board has made référence to the proceedings of a con-
férence held at McGill University, Montréal, entitled Expedited Arbitration-An Alternative, 
1977. Ibid., p. 93. 
The Board has made the back-to-work agreement an intégral part of the collective agreement 
and as of November 1, 1978 that agreement has corne into force. 
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this Board cannot agrée with this image which, in its opinion, incorrectly 
conveys the nature and scope of this new concept. In a trial-marriage,, the 
two parties are consenting. We fail to see how, in the majority of cases, 
the two parties can be considered to be consenting when a first collective 
agreement is imposed. One thing is certain: In the cases under study by 
this Board, it certainly cannot be said that one of the two parties is con-
senting, and when the other has read this décision, we are not sure it will 
be consenting either. However, they will be obliged to apply the terms and 
conditions laid down by the Board."58 
"We believe that there is a better way to characterize the imposition 
of a first collective agreement than as a "trial-marriage"; rather the 
Board may be said to be acting as is done in medicine when a transplant 
opération is performed on a patient. 
Yet, in medicine we know the risks involved in transplants; we are 
particularly aware of the phenomenon of rejection: This occurs when a 
human being's own genetic structure accepts a transplant either poorly or 
not at ail. The transplant is foreign body, and patient's defence 
mechanisms will be mobilized to reject it. The terms and conditions of the 
collective agreement which we hâve inserted are also susceptible to rejec-
tion."59 
"In medicine, the possibility of rejection is minimized by means of 
medicines that act to neutralize the patient's defence mechanism, which 
attempt to reject the transplant. We hâve attempted to insert "medicine" 
clauses into the terms and conditions of the collective agreement. 
...It will be up to the parties - the employers and the unions — to 
train their "nurses" and "doctors" to use the best techniques in sound, 
efficient and honest labour relations, so as to not exacerbate the situation 
during the year to the point of rejection, that is, failure to renew the 
agreements at the end of the year."60 
So far as how the CLRB will interpret and apply this new provision in 
the future, the Board has made the following observation: 
"The Board is anxious to repeat this for the édification not only of 
the union members and the employer involved in the présent dispute but 
of ail union members and employers who might appear before it. The law 
as a whole is intended to make irresponsible individuals aware that they 
may be obliged to pay the price for their lack of restraint and common 
sensé."61 
"...The insertion of Section 171.1 in the Fédéral Code créâtes an 
exception to the gênerai System and its gênerai thrust, an exception that 
does not relieve the parties of their obligation to continue to make the ef-
forts normally expected of them with a view to freely reaching an 
58 Radiomutuei', op. cit., pp. 83 and 84. 
59 Ibid.,p.8S. 
60 Ibid.,p. 89. 
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understanding and to negotiating their own collective agreement. In-
tervention by this Board will be the exception rather than the rule and the 
possibility of such an intervention does not absolve parties of their obliga-
tion and duty to do ail in their power to conclude a collective agreement. 
It might also happen that owing to an error in judgement a party will 
resort to a work stoppage which will not in fact suffice to convince the 
Board that it should intervene, and one or both parties will therefore pay 
the price for their lack of judgement or restraint."62 
"But of itself the hard fact of a strike that has been going on for a 
long time is not the crucial criterion that will persuade the Board to in-
tervene... The parties would be sadly mistaken if they believed for one 
minute that this Board will without fail find it "advisable" to intervene in 
such circumstances. 
The Board also firmly believes that the worst settlement that might 
be agreed by a party is worth a hundred times as much as an imposed set-
tlement... 
Furthermore, the Board sincerely believes that Parliament has pro-
vided itself with a remedy against bad faith and intransigence, and we 
stress this second term. 
Finally, this Board also trusts that the main virtue of section 171.1 
rests much more with the dissuasive effect of its existence in the Code 
than with its repeated application."63 
CONCLUSION 
Negotiation of a first collective agreement frequently results in pro-
longed industrial conflict. This has been the case in Canada as well as in the 
United States. The hitherto existing standard remedy of cease and desist 
orders hâve been found to be either completely ineffective or too little and 
too late. Recognizing this fact, four jurisdictions — B.C., Manitoba, 
Québec and Canada — hâve accordingly amended their respective labour 
codes. 
Given the fact that the British Columbia Labour Code provision on 
first agreement is the prototype for the Fédéral amendment, the B.C. ex-
périence with it since 1974 provides the necessary évidence to suggest that 
the Fédéral Code amendment might achieve its remédiai objective without 
discouraging free collective bargaining. The letter.and spirit of the décision 
6i Ibid., p. 59. 
62 Ibid., p. 60. 
63 Ibid., p. 63. 
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of the CLRB on Radiomutuel partly confirms this cautious optimism. But it 
is somewhat prématuré to predict the long run efficacy of this policy on first 
agreement. Such a prédiction should be based on a detailed study of what 
has happened to those unions after the expiry of the externally imposed first 
collective agreements. 
Those Canadian jurisdictions which currently do not hâve first agree-
ment provisions should consider other alternatives to externally imposed 
agreements. One such alternative is to look to means of strengthening 
unions through greater flexibility of policy on certification which would 
permit small unions to combine and force into existence more realistic and 
viable bargaining units which could withstand a determined employer from 
stone-walling negotiations or destroying the newly certified unions. If such 
alternatives are found to be not feasible, thèse jurisdictions must give 
serious considération for first collective agreement amendment to their 
respective labour codes. 
La conclusion de la première convention collective: 
analyse d'une modification au Code canadien du travail 
La conclusion d'une première convention collective de travail donne souvent 
lieu à un conflit prolongé. Il en a toujours été ainsi au Canada comme aux États-
Unis. Le remède traditionnel des injonctions a été jugé tout à fait inefficace: c'est 
trop peu et trop tard. Reconnaissant cette situation, quatre gouvernements cana-
diens — La Colombie Britannique, le Manitoba, le Québec et l'État fédéral — ont 
modifié leur Code du travail respectif. Le présent article analyse les raisons qui sous-
tendent et justifient cette modification au Code canadien du travail. 
Selon ce changement, quand les parties aux négociations d'une première con-
vention collective de travail sont incapables d'en venir à une entente et qu'elles ont 
suivi tout le processus juridique préalable à la grève et au lock-out, le Ministre peut 
ordonner au Conseil d'enquêter sur le conflit et, s'il l'estime opportun, de fixer les 
dispositions de la convention collective. 
Suite à cette requête du Ministre, le Conseil peut déterminer les dispositions 
d'une convention collective qui régit les parties et devient exécutoire, sauf si celles-ci 
sont subséquemment modifiées par écrit par les parties elles-mêmes. Cette conven-
tion restera en vigueur pendant une année à compter de la date de sa détermination 
par le Conseil. 
La modification à la loi prévoit aussi certaines lignes directrices et certains critè-
res que le Conseil doit suivre lors de l'établissement de la première convention collec-
tive. Celui-ci doit donner aux parties l'occasion de présenter une preuve et de faire 
des représentations. Le Conseil doit, entre autres choses, tenir compte de ce qui suit: 
a) de la mesure dans laquelle les parties ont ou n'ont pas négocié de bonne foi dans 
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un effort pour s'entendre entre elles sur le contenu de la première convention collec-
tive; b) s'il en existe, des conditions de travail négociées collectivement pour des sala-
riés remplissant des fonctions identiques ou similaires dans des situations identiques 
ou similaires à celles dans lesquelles se trouvent les salariés de l'unité de négociation; 
c) de tout autre sujet que le Conseil estimera de nature à l'aider à mettre au point des 
conditions équitables et raisonnables dans les circonstances. 
La substance de cette modification indique une orientation nettement différente 
de ce qui se faisait jusqu'ici. Le CCRT, à l'initiative exclusive du Ministre, a mainte-
nant le pouvoir d'exercer juridiquement sa compétence en vue de régler un conflit 
d'intérêts en autant qu'il s'agisse d'une première convention collective. 
Étant donné que la stipulation du Code du travail de la Colombie Britannique 
concernant la première convention collective est le prototype de la modification du 
Code canadieny l'expérience de cette province en la matière depuis 1974 témoigne 
que la modification au Code canadien du travail peut atteindre son objectif sans dis-
suader de la libre négociation collective. La lettre et l'esprit de la décision du CCRT 
dans l'affaire de Radio Mutuel confirme en partie cet optimisme prudent. Il est ce-
pendant quelque peu prématuré de prédire l'efficacité à long terme de cette politique 
touchant l'arbitrage de la première convention collective. Une telle prédiction devrait 
se fonder sur une étude approfondie de ce qui est advenu à ces syndicats à l'expira-
tion des premières conventions imposées par des tiers. 
Les provinces canadiennes qui n'ont pas adopté de législation en matière d'arbi-
trage de la première convention collective devraient songer à d'autres mesures en lieu 
et place de ces conventions imposées par une tierce partie. L'une d'entre elles serait 
de voir s'il ne serait pas possible de renforcer les syndicats par une plus grande flexi-
bilité en matière d'accréditation de façon à permettre aux petits syndicats de s'allier 
et de donner naissance à des unités de négociation plus réalistes et plus viables, ce qui 
pourrait empêcher un employeur donné de faire échec aux négociations ou de détrui-
re les syndicats nouvellement accrédités. Si de telles mesures ne sont pas possibles, 
ces provinces devraient songer sérieusement à insérer dans leur législation du travail 
les dispositions relatives à l'arbitrage de la première convention collective. 
